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BOOK NOTICE
Monuments to the Past in a Leveling Wind

Benjamin Means
WRITIEN IN STONE: PUBLIC MONUMENTS IN CHANGING SOCIE
TIES. By Sanford Levinson. Durham: Duke University Press. 1998.
Pp. xiii, 144. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $13.95.
Early in the twentieth century, the Emperor Franz Joseph spon
sored a monument to Hungary's history - a Millennium
Monument containing statues of the country's heroes, as well as
statues of the proud sponsor and his family (p. 5). When the com
munists took over in 1919, the statues of Franz Joseph and the rest
of the Hapsburgs were dragged out of the Millennium Monument
and replaced with more politically correct statuary (p. 8). Counter
revolutionaries, though, retook the country and reinstated the
Hapsburg Statues in the Millennium Monument - until a later re
gime once again reshuffled the millennial display (pp. 9-10).
Professor Sanford Levinson1 recounts the Eastern European "high
comedy" of the Millennium Monument to illustrate how those in
power use public space to inculcate desired political norms (p. 10).

In Written in Stone: Public Monuments in Changing Societies,
Professor Levinson's central concern is the effect multiculturalism
has on the use of public space (p. 23). Levinson draws many of his
examples from the American South, and he considers what is at
stake in deciding which statues belong in public parks and what
flags should fly over state capitols. The American situation, unlike
the Hungarian one, is characterized more by its sheer number of
perspectives than by radical shifts from one view to another (p. 24),
and so the meaning of public monuments is often hotly debated.
Says Levinson:
My particular concern is the following: Do we, as a society, have a
duty to the past to continue to give pride of sacred place to monu
ments to our - and what one means by "our" is perhaps the central
question of this book - own "Lost Cause" of the Confederate States
of America in spite of altogether persuasive arguments not only that
this cause was racist at its core, but also that some of the specific mon
uments, such as New Orleans's Liberty Monument, leave nothing to
the imagination in terms of their racism? [p.32]
1. Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin.
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Levinson considers various solutions to the problem posed by
public monuments that offend at least some in society, but he resists
adopting any proposal wholeheartedly. Although Levinson does
not explicitly offer an answer, his book2 seems to suggest an ap
proach: engaging in careful factual inquiry and, where possible,
favoring counterspeech over censorship. Levinson would have us
slow down and think carefully about what is at stake in each dispute
over cultural meaning, weigh a.µ of the available alternatives, and
proceed with caution.
This notice sets forth and analyzes the main lines of Levinson's
arguments: that the meaning of public symbols often is indetermin
able in a multicultural society, and that generalized solutions are
impossible in such a climate of ambiguity. In so doing, I reduce the
arguments to a linear progression, though the book itself proceeds
in somewhat nonlinear fashion. Levinson allows examples to pile
upon each other in a careful accretion of meaning - a technique
that I cannot hope to replicate here. The reader's remedy, of
course, is to turn to Levinson's book.

THE

CONTESTED MEANING OF PUBLIC SYMBOLS

Public symbols are state-sponsored speech and include, inter
statues on public land (even if paid for with private money)
(pp. 89-90), state flags (pp. 32, 52-53), and the names of public
spaces (pp. 17-24). In assessing the symbolic value of a cultural ob
ject, Levinson attaches great importance to the space in which that
object is situated.3 The debate over public symbols takes on partic
ular importance in "sacred space" - "public cemeteries, state and
national capitol grounds, and other ground that is invested with
special meaning within the structure of the civil religion that helps
to constitute a given social order." As state speech, public symbols
have a norm-shaping function. Even art in the public sphere is em
ployed "to symbolize the public order and to inculcate in its viewers
appropriate attitudes toward that order" (p. 39).

alia,

The meaning of public symbols is open to debate, however, es
pecially in today's climate of "identity politics."4 Levinson illus
trates the ambiguity of monuments' messages by recounting several
recent controversies. "When Congress proposed placing a statue of
three suffragists in the Capitol Rotunda, some African-American
2. At 146 pages, pictures included, and with only 27 footnotes, the book actually reads
more like an essay.
3. P. 37. Public space can also be "metaphorical" and may include official holidays and
songs.
4. P. 26. "It is a notorious truth that the United States is home to an ever-more
fractionated population tempted to engage in what has come to be termed 'identity politics.'"
P. 26.
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feminists opposed the move because no African-American suffrag
ists were included. They felt excluded by the statue (pp. 28-29).
Bitter debates also arose recently regarding a proposed statue of
Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Should he have a cigar? Should he be
portrayed in his wheelchair? (pp. 29-30). Anti-tobacco groups
wanted to remove the cigar, and advocates for the disabled insisted
that F.D.R. be portrayed in his wheelchair. In 1997, George
Washington's name was removed from a public school in New
Orleans; father of the country or not, he had owned slaves. The
school is now named after the African-American surgeon, Dr.
Charles Richard Drew (p. 24). Curiosity piqued, one wishes that
Levinson had provided more information about these controversies
and how they were resolved.s
Professor Levinson devotes most of his attention to the fate of
monuments to the Confederacy, over which battle lines are even
more starkly drawn. In defense of southern tradition, Levinson
quotes the historian Eugene Genovese: " 'The northern victory fa
1865 silenced a discretely southern interpretation of American
history and national identity, and it promoted a contemptuous dis
missal of all things southern as nasty, racist, immoral, and intellec
tually inferior' " (p. 34). Genovese believes that the contemporary
campaign against Confederate monuments is nothing less than " 'a
cultural and political atrocity . . . "' (p. 35). On the other hand,
Levinson cites James Forman, who argued in the Yale Law Journal
that the Confederate flag is irredeemably racist: "When a state
government chooses to fly the flag above its . capitol's dome, it
'sends a message . . . glorif[ying] and memorializ[ing] slavery, Jim
Crow, and subsequent resistance to change' " (p. 93).
Levinson seems resigned to the conclusion that debate over the
cultural meaning of public symbols cannot be resolved in any satis
factory way. A Confederate statue inevitably will mean different
things to different people. The implicit premise is postmodern that cultural artifacts have no independent meaning beyond that
assigned to them by various groups.6 Levinson never suggests a
method, beyond paying close attention to "context," by which one
might find one interpretation better than another.
5. Although Levinson focuses largely on controversies that involve a dispute over
meaning, controversy can also arise where meaning is not in dispute. A public monument
might clearly stand for a particular proposition and still spark debate over the desirability of
that proposition. For example, in the Millennium Monument, mingling Franz Joseph's statue
with statues of assorted national heroes would convey the message that Franz, too, is a great
Hungarian.
6. Cf. p. 98 (noting that postmodernists would reject an argument that assigned a definite
meaning to Confederate symbols - and seeming to identify with that view). For the canoni
cal work on postmodernism (irony intended), see JEAN-FRAN<;:ors LYOTARD, THE
POSTMODERN CoNDmoN: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE (Geoff Bennington & Brian
Massumi trans., 1984).
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The relevance to law of Levinson's postmodern view of public
monuments becomes clearer in light of the fact that he once
described the Constitution as a sort of public monument: "Consti
tutions, of the written variety especially, are usefully viewed as a
means of freezing time by controlling the future through the 'hard
ness' of language encoded in a monumental document . . . "7 One
wonders the extent to which Levinson feels that the multicultural
ism bedeviling the interpretation of statues also bedevils the inter
pretation of statutes.8 Perhaps it is some indication of his view,
though, that Levinson once claimed that "[t]here are as many plau
sible readings of the United States Constitution as there are ver
sions of Hamlet."9
.

For those who have not yet embraced the idea that meaning is
indeterminate, the absence of explicit arguments for postmodern
ism may be disappointing. On the other hand, Levinson has pro
vided fascinating examples of the difficulties in assigning meaning.
Rather than spend an afternoon dusting off old Supreme Court
Reporters, Levinson offers a constitutional meta-theorist's10 guided
tour of our public parks and monuments. To the extent Levinson
shows that disputes over the meaning of public monuments are
insoluble, he strengthens the case for his broader argument about
legal interpretation.
The lingering problem that confronts Levinson is that a govern
ment decisionmaker must still have some means of deciding what to
7.
8.

Sanford Levinson,

Law as Literature, 60 TEXAS L. REv. 373, 376 (1982).

Multiculturalism, in Levinson's view, makes the postmodern problem visible. Meaning
may be unstable and yet appear solid to one cultural group. Competing cultural perspectives
break down the apparent uniformity, revealing a deeper-seated fragmentation of meaning.

9. Levinson, supra note 7, at 391. For criticism of Levinson and an argument that mean
ing can be ascertained from context, see Gerald Graff, "Keep off the Grass, " "Drop Dead, "
and Other Indeterminacies: A Response to Sanford Levinson, 60 TEXAS L. REv. 405 (1982).
In an article similar to Written in Stone, Levinson actually once conceded that context can
provide enough clues to assign meaning. See Sanford Levinson, They Whisper: Reflections
on Flags, Monuments, State Holidays, and the Construction of Social Meaning in a Multicul
tural Society, 70 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 1079, 1102 (1995) ("[T]heoretical polysemy is really quite

different from the actual circumstances of a specific context. 'Meet me at the bank' is fatally
ambiguous unless we know whether the speaker is interested in money or swimming. Once
we do know that, then, as a matter of pragmatics, most of us would be fairly confident about
the likely meaning of the otherwise 'indeterminate."'). Like Captain Ahab, though,
Levinson lets this last apple of possibility drop, cindered, to the earth and returns to the
white whale of postmodernism, renouncing all hope of finding meaning. See, e.g., p. 98 ("It is
hard to see how anyone who has been touched (some would say 'infected') by one or another
variety of postmodernist theory can be entirely comfortable endorsing [the equal protection]
argument."). For the cindered apple reference, see HERMAN MELVILLE, MoBY DICK 534
(The Modem Library 1926) (1851). Captain Ahab does not afford a perfect comparison,
however, since Ahab's mission was to find Moby Dick - which some have read as Ahab's
search for meaning. Levinson's quest is to show that the quarry (meaning) remains ever
elusive.

10. See generally Sanford Levinson, The Audience for Constitutional Meta-Theory (or,
Why, And To Whom, Do I Write The Things I Do?), 63 U. CoLO. L. REv. 389 (1992).
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do with public symbols. If even the most idiosyncratic interpreta
tions are "valid" at some level, the resulting cacophony will not
prove helpful in guiding state decisionmaking.
NEUTRALITY
States could just give up entirely the project of endorsing certain
ideas over others and act only to make sure all views are heard.
Levinson identifies this approach with Professor Owen Fiss.11 Stud
ied neutrality would be the proper limit of state speech, leaving
advocacy to private groups. Such a restriction on government
speech is not entirely unprecedented - the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment has been interpreted to preclude states
from endorsing religion.12
Application of a neutrality requirement b eyond the
Establishment Clause context is unrealistic in Levinson's view,
though, because the government is already an active participant in
speech in many aspects of our lives. The curriculum taught in pub
lic schools is perhaps the most obvious example (pp. 84-85). Pro
viding equal time for responses to every view endorsed by
government could lead to ridiculous consequences. Would the gov
ernment have to advocate cigarette smoking as well as condemn it?
Levinson might also have noted that neutrality presupposes a
baseline. Neutrality might require obliterating all traces of past
governmental favoritism, or it might apply only to future govern
ment speech. If neutrality has retroactive effect, then states would
be forced to busy themselves in some combination of retraction of
old messages and addition of new ones, resulting in incoherence, an
all-things-to-all-people neutrality. If neutrality is instead an ap
proach to adopt and not a result to achieve, then the neutrality
thesis would run into the objection that is often lodged against the
neoclassical free market: those who have more "inputs" at the
beginning will always do better, even if the process itself is fair. As
to "inputs," in Southern cities like Savannah, Georgia·, it is almost
impossible to swing a dead cat without hitting a Confederate
monument.
11. Pp. 78-79. This may somewhat overstate Ftss's position, though. Ess would have the
state intervene to "enrich public debate," which is not necessarily equivalent to merely in
creasing the number of voices heard. See Owen M. Ess, Why the State?, 100 HARv. L. REv.
781, 786 (1987). The word "enrich" suggests room for normative evaluation. Ess seems to
recognize a difference between quantity and quality when he acknowledges the danger that
the state might "restrict or impoverish . . . public debate." Id. at 787 (emphasis added). In
any event, the neutrality thesis is worth considering in the strong form in which Levinson
presents it, whether or not it accurately conveys Owen Ftss's view of the matter.
12. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
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EQUAL PROTECTION
Confederate monuments and flags might also be attacked as
state-sponsored racism that violates the equal protection guaran
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 13 The Fourteenth
Amendment approach requires attributing a racist purpose to the
state symbols. Levinson admits that advocates of this view can mar
shal powerful evidence in some cases. For example, under
Governor George Wallace, Alabama raised the Confederate flag on
April 25, 1963, just in time to greet Attorney General Robert F.
Kennedy, who was visiting to discuss the integration of the Univer
sity of Alabama (p. 91 ). The flag flew over the state capitol for the
next thirty years (p. 91).
Even though racists first rallied behind the Confederate flag,
one might argue that contemporary motives are what matter and
that it is acceptable for government to honor the will of the major
ity (pp. 95, 100). Levinson notes that in NAACP v. Hunt, the
Eleventh Circuit upheld Alabama's right to fly the Confederate
flag, stating that '"[although] it is unfortunate that the State of Ala
bama chooses to utilize its property in a manner that offends a large
proportion of its population, . . . that is a political matter which is
not within our province to decide."'14 The court rejected the
NAACP's equal protection argument, because it was not convinced
that Alabama had a "racially discriminatory" motivation and
because "there is no unequal application of the state policy; all citi
zens are exposed to the flag. "15
Levinson seems skeptical of the NAACP's legal claim for a dif
ferent reason. His main objection is that the equal protection argu
ment assumes that one can know what a cultural symbol means.
"How does anyone, let alone a culture, come to terms with the inev
itably mixed meanings of the symbols around which we organize
our lives?" (p. 97). Even if it were possible to assign meaning,
Levinson questions whether we should have confidence enough in
our conclusions to make them legally binding (p. 97). In sum,
Levinson feels that legal arguments are plausible but that courts
and constitutions "are quite limited in their actual power when
what is at stake is the politics of cultural meaning" (p. 104).

13. P. 92. Levinson does not specify a specific constitutional argument within the
Fourteenth Amendment context, but I assume that equal protection is what he has in mind.
14. Pp. 91-92 (quoting 891 F.2d 1555, 1566 (11th Cir. 1990)).
15. Hunt, 891 F.2d at 1562.
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pAYING ATTENTION TO CONTEXT:
MORE NUANCED APPROACHES

In the last section of his book, Professor Levinson asks what
"political decency" demands (pp. 111-29). Surprisingly, he disposes
of the Confederate flag controversy quickly:
I think the answer is easy. Although . . I would not have the courts
.

prohibit a state [from flying the Confederate flag] ...that does not in
the least entail my support . . . . Even if one can believe that the
Confederate flag symbolizes something other than the brutal regime
of chattel slavery, it seems insensitive, to put it mildly, for a state to
persist in adopting ...something that so easily, and legitimately, can
be given a thoroughly negative meaning. [p.112]

It is not entirely clear what Levinson means by "legitimately,"
because he has not offered a means of distinguishing valid and inva
lid interpretations of a cultural object. This seems less an argument
than an appeal to the reader's sensibilities. Perhaps Levinson is
adopting "Justice Stewart's famous statement about the possibility
of developing a general definition of pornography . . . 'I know it
when I see it' " (p. 75). It may be, as Levinson hints, "that general
izations get us nowhere . . . " (p. 75) .
One is tempted to conclude that Levinson's "political decency"
objection to the Confederate flag stems entirely from the amount of
offense actually taken by · African Americans (and whites).
Although nonracist interpretations are conceivable, it is a slap in
the face for the majority to fly the flag despite the hurt caused to
those who take a different view of the flag. From this perspective,
the validity of competing interpretations would not much matter.
Levinson must mean more than that, though, because he contends
that "[m]onuments present altogether more difficult issues" (p.
113). He quotes the director of the Amistad Research Center, who
argues that racist monuments should be preserved as "a symbol of
'racism's shame' and a reminder, especially to youngsters 'of the
courage of the whole civil rights movement' " (p. 113). Yet, equal
offense is probably taken to both means of presenting cultural sym
bols, and the Confederate flag might also be interpreted as a sym
bol of racism's shame. Perhaps the difference is location - a statue
in a public parks arguably does not convey as strong a message of
official endorsement as a flag over the state capitol.
Professor Levinson adopts a more searching inquiry with regard
to the Confederate memorial in Austin, Texas and demonstrates, by
example, careful, fact-specific analysis. The memorial, he explains,
was built in 1903 as a tribute to the Confederate war dead and
stands in front of the Texas state capitol. "On a pedestal stand
seven-foot statues of an artilleryman, an infantryman, a cavalry
man, and a sailor, representing the four branches of the
Confederate armed forces. Rising from the center of the pedestal is
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a seven-and-one-half-feet-tall statue of Jefferson Davis" (p. 53).
Carved on the base is a list of Confederate states and the following
inscription:
DIED FOR STATE RIGHTS
GUARANTEED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
THE PEOPLE OF THE SOUTH, ANIMATED BY THE SPIRIT
OF 1776, TO PRESERVE THEIR RIGHTS, WITHDREW FROM
THE FEDERAL COMPACT IN 1861. THE NORTH RESORTED
TO COERCION. THE SOUTH, AGAINST OVERWHELMING
N U M B E R S A N D RE S O U R C E S , F O U GH T UNTIL
EXHAUSTED. [p. 55]

As a matter of political theory, Levinson believes that the
Constitution might be interpreted to permit secession, although this
"is a bit like trying to analyze dispassionately whether our own par
ents really should have married one another . . . " (p. 59). For
Levinson, the context of the argument is as important as its content.
"Along with discussion of the high theory of sovereignty . . . one
must attend to the reality of . . . chattel slavery . . . " (p. 60).
"Whatever one's views on the theoretical merits of secession and
self-determination, they must always be tempered by recognition of
the particular context within which a secessionist argument is being
made, whether in South Carolina in 1861 or in Bosnia in 1995" (p.
61). Levinson does not believe that one must conclude that the
Confederate soldiers, "like medieval suicides," should be denied
the equivalent of a sacred burial. But then what to do?
Levinson outlines various possible approaches. At one extreme,
Austin might get rid of the monument (p. 122). Such all-out "cul
tural warfare" on the Confederacy seems wrongheaded to
Levinson, in part because most of the soldiers who died were fol
lowing a misguided sense of loyalty and not acting out of rabid ra
cism (p. 122). Levinson is quick to note that he would not support
any kind of memorial to the SS soldiers buried in Bitburg, and he
hopes that they do not rest in peace (p. 123). The basis for his dis
tinction "is that SS members were not ordinary citizen-soldiers . . . "
(p. 123). One wonders how Levinson would feel about memorials
to "ordinary" German soldiers who, like the Confederate soldiers,
were arguably only following orders out of misplaced loyalty.
Would Levinson also wish them an eternity on the rotisserie spits of
Hell? The reasonableness of Levinson's conclusion seems to de
pend in part on one's affinity with his personal sensibilities.
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At the other extreme, Austin might do nothing at all.16 Austin
could also erect a sign saying that the City takes no position, or a
sign disavowing any association with the memorial (a noisy with
drawal of sorts) (p. 114). Really using the sign for all it is worth,
Austin might declare:
Although these views represent a plausible constitutional theory, it is
essential to recognize that what precipitated secession was the desire
to maintain an immoral regime of racially-based chattel slavery.· The
failure of the white South to recognize the claim to equality and self
determination of black slaves thus invalidates the appeal to the princi
ples of the Declaration of Independence that might, in another con
text, have justified secession . . . [p. 114]
.

The City might also "sandblast" the original inscription and leave
the monument either blank or with a new inscription (p. 121).
Additional monuments might be built to stand alongside the origi
nal, (pp. 114-21), or the monument might be placed in a museum (p.
121).
Placing the monument in a museum would help put it in histori
cal context, but the same problems of presentation would exist (p.
121). The museum director would have to decide whether to let the
monument speak for itself, or whether to attach additional explana
tion. The monument might take on different meaning in the midst
of a display of Confederate firearms and swords than it would in the
context of an exhibit about the evils of slavery. However carefully
displayed, the monument could still stand for racism. As Levinson
puts it, "historicization is itself obviously a complex phenomenon,
for one always wonders whether the message is that 'this was once,
but can - ought - never be again' or, instead 'this was once and
can, with imaginative effort and physical courage, be repeated in
our own lifetime' " (p. 123).
COUNTERSPEECH AND ITS PROBLEMS

For Levinson, adding monuments seems the best solution: "If
forced to choose, I would opt for a set of monuments, of sufficient
grandeur and placed in the heart of the Capitol grounds, commem
orating different aspects of the African American experience" (p.
127). The monuments would not ignore the horrors of slavery, but
they would be more than expressions of victimhood (pp. 127-28).
Levinson envisions including, for example, a statue of former
Congresswoman Barbara Jordan (p. 128). He shows genuine en
thusiasm for historian Patricia Nelson Limerick's vision of " 'a dif
ferent kind of memorial - one in which no point of view
dominates,' in which many monuments to all sorts of people would
16. P. 114. Whatever its merits, Levinson believes this is the only proposal Austin will
actually follow. P. 123.
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contend for recognition" (p. 128). Levinson regards as "delicious"
Limerick's further idea for "Managed Contention Site[s]," where
"heated verbal disagreements over history would be encouraged"
(pp. 128-29).
Professor Levinson seems to endorse the idea of counterspeech
elsewhere in his book. The Liberty Monument in New Orleans, for
example, now contains a plaque " 'IN HONOR OF THOSE
AMERICANS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE CONFLICT WHO
DIED IN THE BATILE OF LIBERTY PLACE. A CONFLICT
OF THE PAST THAT SHOULD TEACH US LESSONS FOR
THE FUTURE' " (p. 50). The Monument, built in 1891, formerly
contained a paean to white supremacy, and, as of 1974, another
plaque explaining that " 'the sentiments expressed [in the first
plaque] are contrary to the philosophy and beliefs of present-day
New Orleans' " (p. 48). Levinson wonders whether the point
counterpoint approach was preferable to the calculated emptiness
of the new inscription. The earlier version "at least educated the
careful reader in the ideological stakes behind the ascription of
meaning to the Liberty Monument" (p. 52).
Levinson acknowledges that state sponsorship of monuments
imbues them with legitimacy that may make responses difficult. In
addition, he points out that counterspeech may not live up to its
name. Adding monuments to include certain groups, for example,
might be more supplemental than challenging (pp. 25-26). The end
result could be a bizarre amalgamation of cultural heroes (p. 26).
This is reminiscent of the spread of Greek religion, in the course of
which the conquering Greeks swept up local deities into a dysfunc
tional Olympic family.
Nonetheless, Levinson clearly prefers such responses to mo;re
sweeping legal restrictions. One could argue, though, that robust
debate is difficult to achieve as a practical matter, and that it will
too often proceed without the dignity that should mark enlightened
discourse. As to practicality, even if made to engage in a debate,
statues do not lend themselves to a marketplace of ideas. Statues
can, after all, only tum a deaf ear to criticism. The market meta
phor is also problematic in that the losing side cannot gracefully
quit the field or change its tune. Moreover, space and aesthetic
considerations might constrain the vigor of a debate carried on
through public monuments. On the other hand, Levinson's point is
that the meaning of monuments is not after all written in stone, but
is subject to interpretation and reinterpretation. Changing the con
text in which a monument is situated may alter its meaning.
To engage public monuments in politicized debate at all, though,
may be to thwart the timelessness to which they aspire. "All monu
ments are efforts, in their own way, to stop time" (p. 7). Quoting
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Nietzsche, Levinson points out that monuments embody " 'a be1ief
in the coherence and continuity of what is great in all ages . . . a
protest against the change of generations and against transitori
ness' " (p. 7). As to the possibility of permanence, Levinson con
tends that "[h]istory . . . moves relentlessly to mock any such
beliefs" (p. 7) - a sentiment echoed in Yeats's poem "Nineteen
Hundred and Nineteen": "Come let us mock at the great/ That had
such burdens on the mind/ And toiled so hard and late/ To leave
some monument behind,/ Nor thought of the leveling wind."17 Per
haps a pluralist society cannot afford sacred cows, but we should
still question whether the inevitably of change justifies contemptu
ous treatment of the monuments of another age.
The superintendent of the Little Bighorn Battlefield has plans
for the battle's 120th anniversary that seem a perfect example of
the lack of dignity that might attend debate involving public monu
ments. According to Levinson, the commemoration:
Would include the Indians riding on horses· to the gravesite where the
two hundred U.
S.soldiers are buried and "counting coup" by hitting
with a stick the stone obelisk marking the grave. According to the
Times, "Counting coup was a battle tradition in which warriors
proved their skill and courage by striking an enemy with a special
stick and returning safely to the tribe." As to this, [one commentator]
asks, "What would people say if cavalry re-enactors went to Wounded
Knee and touched the monument [to the Sioux dead] with sabers?"
[pp. 29-30]

Levinson does not say whether he approves of "counting coup" as a
way of contesting the meaning of the Little Bighorn memorial.18
To the extent counterspeech is considered a kinder, gentler
alternative to censorship, it is worth noting that its effect can be
equally destructive. The mere existence of counterspeech in the
sacred public space - regardless of the cogency of the arguments
- does the damage. We become the historical force, the leveling
wind, that mocks the monuments of another era. We should fight
against the misconceptions and evils of other times and places, but
we should also be careful not to "traffic in mockery."19

17. WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS, Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen, in THE COLLECTED
PoEMS OF W.B. YEATS 206, 209 (Richard J. Fmneran ed., rev. 2d ed. 1996); see also Percy
Bysshe Shelley, Ozymandias, in THE CoMPLETE POEMS OF PERCY BYSSHE SHELLEY 589
(Modem Library 1994) (presenting a similarly dim view of the possibility of achieving im
mortal glory through the construction of public monuments).
18. Levinson's unwillingness to take sides is apparently a conscious decision. See
Levinson, supra note 10, at 392 ("[M]ost of what I write [does not] talce[ ] a recognizable
position on any of the most contentious constitutional issues of the day . . . . )
19. YEATS, supra note 17, at 210.
"

.

1628

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 97:1617

CONCLUSION

Levinson has written a fascinating reflection on the transmission
of cultural meaning through the use of public space. His book is
both thought provoking and well written, although one sometimes
wishes for a more thorough exposition of particular lines of analy
sis. Given his emphasis on the importance of context, it is occasion
ally frustrating not to have more concrete information about the
examples central to the book. Nonetheless, Levinson succeeds in
immersing the reader in the difficult questions posed by monu
ments in a multicultural society - and their intractability.

